Pandemic Flu Information and Planning

Planning Assumptions

In order for planning to proceed in a meaningful way, both within the steering committee and in units across campus, it was necessary to make some assumptions about the nature of a pandemic flu crisis. Among assumptions most important in planning are those embedded in the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) scientific literature, including:

  • The shared belief among scientists and public health experts is that a pandemic flu will occur sometime within the next few years and that it is not a matter of “if” but “when.”
  • Although not the only possibility, the current H5N1 influenza A virus that has spread among poultry and waterfowl in over 55 countries is a likely candidate for the next pandemic.
  • WHO lays out three criteria necessary for a pandemic to occur, the first two of which already exist:
    • There is no immunity among the global population for the virus.
    • The virus must be able to infect people.
    • The virus must be able to readily spread from person to person.
  • Based on WHO’s six-stage warning system, the current situation is at stage 3, with very limited human-to-human transmission.

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Current WHO warning level


Current WHO warning level

 

  • Stage 4 is reached when the virus (H5N1 or other influenza A or B virus) changes genetically so that there is significant person-to-person spread.
  • Stage 4 is most likely to occur initially in Asia, but there will probably be widespread global disease within weeks or several months. This window will allow for active implementation of planning.
  • Once mutation or genetic change in the virus allows person-to-person spread, the mortality rate of the disease (if H5N1) may change. (Currently, nearly two-thirds of all people infected die.) If the mortality rate increases, the chance of a pandemic decreases because the virus will have difficulty spreading. If the changed virus is less lethal, the resulting influenza is more likely to cause a pandemic.
  • Because an effective vaccine cannot be produced until after the mutation when the final form of the virus is known, most experts predict there will be no widespread, effective vaccine available during the first six to eight months of a pandemic. (Currently, it takes six months to produce a vaccine.)
  • There will be limited supplies of antiviral medication, which currently is stockpiled by various countries and national and international health agencies.
  • In a pandemic, there will be a shortage of health care personnel and resources, such as hospital beds.
  • Social distancing will be the primary means of protecting healthy people. It is likely there will be the recommendation or order to cancel public events and close schools, perhaps for a period of two to four months.
  • Currently, workplace closure is not predicted, as long as social distancing measures can protect employees.
  • Many experts anticipate that international borders will not be closed since this strategy was not effective for SARS, although countries may decide to do this on their own. This assumption has implications for planning for study abroad and international travel that is common in many university programs.
  • Best estimates of the number of personnel who would not show up for work in a pandemic, either due to illness, family illness, dependent care or personal decisions about risk, are 30 to 35 percent of the workforce. Best estimates of the number of people infected during a pandemic are the same.

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Planning assumptions specific to MSU:

  • In the event that the genetic footprint of H5N1 virus changes to allow transmission from person to person (WHO stage 4), MSU will begin preparations for implementation of the institution’s pandemic plan. This will likely include cancellation of classroom activities when there are multiple influenza cases within the United States. This response will likely occur four to eight weeks after confirmation of genetic change in the virus.
  • All students living on campus will either return home or be directed to alternative appropriate housing if they cannot go home. The Cherry Lane and Spartan Village apartments will remain available to occupants.
  • Academic research will continue, if supplies are available; key cultures, plants and animals will be maintained, as much as possible. Workplace schedules designed to ensure social distancing and minimization of infection risk among co-workers may need to be put into place. Use of masks and gloves for employees will follow public health guidelines. Those students, faculty and staff who are abroad at the onset of a pandemic will be advised whether staying abroad or returning to the United States is the safest option. This advice is dependent upon the nature of the virus, the proposed route of transportation, individual health status and conditions, and the difficulty of arranging travel across borders. The Office of Study Abroad will manage communication to travelers, with appropriate medical guidance. Currently the Travel Clinic is recommending that travelers to East Asia carry a mask with them in the event that the pandemic stage changes.
  • Key research and other support buildings have been identified and prioritized, as buildings that must be maintained, with power, water and other essential services.
  • Some critical employees may choose to live on campus during a pandemic. Current options for this include Kellogg Center, Candlewood Suites, and a designated residence hall.
  • It is possible, though not known, that we will be asked to provide both quarantine facilities and an isolation facility during a pandemic. The facility criteria for isolation and quarantine are on file in the Office of University Physician and buildings that meet these criteria have been identified.

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